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Renegociación oportunista de concesiones de infraestructura como rentismo:
El efecto de los sistemas legales
Este trabajo examina el problema de renegociar concesiones de infraestructu-
ra en América Latina, empleando un modelo de litigación aplicado a contratos de 
incentivos. La renegociación oportunista se define aquí como un juego rentista, 
para mostrar el efecto de las características del sistema legal sobre la probabilidad 
de renegociación. Una conclusión principal es que los sistemas legales en los cua-
les cada parte sufraga sus propios gastos legales, como el de los Estados Unidos, 
son más propensos a la renegociación oportunista. De otra parte, sistemas como 
el británico, donde los gastos legales se concentran en una de las partes, pueden 
desincentivar el comportamiento oportunista al hacerlo más costoso. 
Palabras claves: Subastas, traslado de costas judiciales, incentivos, litigación, 
teoría de la elección pública, rentismo
Clasificaciones jel: D44, D86, D72
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s concessions for infrastructure in developing countries became 
increasingly prevalent as a result of the perceived benefits to the country and its 
inhabitants. These infrastructure concession contracts act to delineate the alloca-
tion of rights, risks, costs, and incentives among the contracting parties. For ex-
ample, a typical concession may allow a private company to build and operate, 
free from competition, an infrastructure project for a period of 20 years. The 
benefits from concessions include the freeing up of scarce funds to be used for 
other pu blic goods, increased efficiency of infrastructure operation as a result of 
the private profit motive, increased economic growth, and more and better infra-
structure services for citizens. 
While the burgeoning growth of concessions for infrastructure is encourag-
ing, the high rate of renegotiation of these concession contracts is not. Indeed, 
over 54% of concessions are renegotiated after only, on average, 3.1 years of the 
contract signing date, as found by Guasch (2004), the common change being a 
reallocation of risks among the parties. This rate of renegotiation is doubtfully 
efficient and leads to the conjecture that either risks were not allocated efficiently 
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ex ante, or one party (the government or private company) is opportunistically tak-
ing ad vantage of information asymmetries to extract a more favorable outcome or 
that some type of macroeconomic shock has occurred. In addition, this high rate 
of renegotiation drives up the cost of capital, resulting in higher tariffs charged 
to infrastructure users. 
Whereas the concept of concessions for infrastructure has been around for 
hundreds of years, widespread private participation in public infrastructure proj-
ects is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the late 1980s, many developing Latin 
American countries, driven by the incentives discussed above, began to offer in-
frastructure concessions to private companies. In the 1990s this trend contin-
ued and accelerated, as approximately 1500 concession contracts, worth about 
Us$470 billion, were signed in the region between governments and private com-
panies, according to Estache and Quesada (2001). The sheer magnitude (in dollar 
amounts and units) of concession contracts, along with the astounding rate of 
renegotiation mentioned above, together act as a very compelling argument for 
investigation into the determinants of renegotiation and methods to mitigate its 
occurrence. Economists generally agree that the contracting out of infrastructure 
facilities in developing countries to private companies is more efficient (and ben-
eficial to citizens) than state run enterprises. But, the problem of renegotiation 
is yet to be solved.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model to evaluate the potential effect of 
the legal system on the probability of renegotiation due to opportunistic behav-
ior. Using as a point of departure a simple auction theoretic framework developed 
by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2000), I will develop a model of litigation with 
incentive contracts. Surprisingly, the literature, in this specific subject, systemati-
cally overlooks the effect of political variables, with few partial exceptions, such 
as Guash,Laffont and Straub (2003) and Guasch (2004). However, although they 
include some political and institutional variables in their estimation, they barely 
mention the potential effect of the legal system in the probability of renegotiation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1 introduces the topic and 
provides some background. Section 2 points out the role of regulation in infra-
structure concessions. In section 3, the problem of renegotiation is defined. In 
Section 4 the empirical results are briefly presented, with some comments on the 
reasonability of the hypotheses from Guasch (2004). Section 5 summarizes the 
results of Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2000), where a simple auction theoretic 
approach is used to evaluate different legal systems from a general perspective. 
In Section 6, I develop a theoretical model of litigation to show the influence of 
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legal systems in the probability of renegotiation in infrastructure concession con-
tracts. Section 7 provides the conclusions and some policy recommendations.
A. Background: Competition for the Market
When trying to introduce private participation in infrastructure the main 
challenge is how to align social and private interests under the framework of 
natural monopolies. A viable alternative is, then, to introduce competitive dis-
cipline into the market in such a way that the outcomes will be welfare enhanc-
ing in terms of allocative and productive efficiency and consumer and producer 
surpluses.
Therefore, when a single or few firms can provide the whole market more 
efficiently, a feasible way to obtain outcomes similar to competitive scenarios is 
by introducing competition for the market. In other words, to arrange bidding 
processes in order to assign the rights of serving a specific market to a single firm 
for a limited period of time.
Accordingly, 78% of concession contracts in Latin America and the Carib-
bean from the mid 80s to 2000 were awarded through competitive bidding, while 
22% were awarded through direct adjudication (bilateral negotiation). 
Sound theory, however, does not always translate into sound policy. Compe-
titive awarding and new regulation methods were promoted in Latin America 
and the Caribbean as the almost infallible recipe for the introduction of private 
TABLE 1
Contract Award Processes for Concessions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean by Sector, mid 1980’s to 2000
      Award process Telecomuni-  Transpor- Water and  Share cations Energy tation sanitation Total of Total
Competitive bidding 245 95 231 125 696 78%
Direct adjudication 
   (Bilateral negotiation) 
15 143 37 4 199 22%
Total 260 238 268 129 895 100%
Source: Guasch (2004)
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participation in infrastructure. Naturally, plenty of issues were unaccounted for 
when approving the reforms. As a result, the scheme has lost popularity, even with 
the memories of the poor performance of state-owned utilities still present.
B. Renegotiation Emerges
Competitive awarding was a great advance of the new concession contracts 
compared to their eighteenth century predecessors.1 However, the potential vul-
nerability of contracts to incompleteness or obsolescence remains unsolved. 
Renegotiation can accomplish a positive role given the inherently incomplete 
nature of concession contracts. Moreover, when properly used, it can be welfare 
enhancing. However, renegotiation resulting from opportunistic behavior can 
reduce or eliminate the expected benefits of competitive bidding.
Renegotiation is, in essence, a rent-transfer mechanism. Given its impartial 
nature, it is the ideal vehicle for rent seekers to exploit. Consequently, as was to 
be expected shortly after the appearance of the first unanticipated contingencies, 
concessionaires realized the potential of renegotiation in their quest for profits.
The first realization was that the proposals were not binding and that they 
could be modified after the contract was signed. As a result, the proposals were 
intended only to win the contest and not to comply with the offered conditions. 
In this sense, once bidders realize renegotiation is feasible and likely, they will 
factor it into their maximization program. Thus, auctions might end up selecting 
not the most efficient provider but the most skilled at renegotiations. Second, in 
the absence of competitors2 the quest for rents through renegotiation by conces-
sionaires depends only on the resources or effort destined to obtain the transfer. 
The effort costs can take the form of legal expenditures, bribes etc. 
The Government, on the other hand, may have an incentive to take advan-
tage of renegotiation if it is politically profitable or when it is subject to capture 
by interest groups (i.e., when the users of the concession facilities are few with 
big amounts at stake). That is to say, if users are able to exert effective pressure or 
1 The first concessions date from 1777 in France (Perrier water contract); in the Us, in 1792, with the turn-
pikes [ the first toll road connecting Philadelphia and Lancaster was chartered in 1792, and opened in 1794 
(Klein,(2002)], and London in the 1820’s ( private water companies).
2 Renegotiation is not subject to competitive pressures and their associated discipline.
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create motivations for politicians and government officials to obtain a favorable 
outcome in the opposite direction of the interest of the concessionaire. 
Nevertheless, in the case of concession contracts, consumers are large num-
bers with relatively small amounts at stake, while producers are only one and pre-
viously organized entity (no competitors) with a large amount at stake. This gives 
a definite advantage to concessionaires, given the inherent difficulties of collective 
action for the affected users. (Olson 1965). As a result, under the renegotiation 
scenario, concessionaires are more effective in the pursuit of their interests than 
consumers. Furthermore, other relevant aspects in developing countries such as 
institutional weakness, corruption, and budget restrictions,3 exacerbate the problem 
and incline the balance even more in favor of concessionaires.
In conclusion, opportunistic renegotiation can be characterized as a rent seek-
ing game «which embodies a social cost in terms of the foregone product of the 
resources employed in rent seeking» (Tollison, 1997). As such, it poses an important 
concern for less developed countries, where renegotiation is increasingly utilized.
To address this problem, extensive work have been done regarding the design 
of concessions in terms of allocation of risks and regulation (Estache and de Rus, 
2000), awarding methods (Engel and Galetovic, 1998), contract enforcement (Laf-
font and Meleu, 2001). Some of these exercises try to cope with the presumably 
unsolvable4 problem of contract incompleteness. Also, they almost always take 
politics as a «given», thus neglecting problems such as legal systems, weak insti-
tutions, interest groups, regulatory capture and rent seeking behavior, among 
others. A good illustration of this is the increasing promotion of «independent» 
regulatory agencies formed by experts responsible for designing and administer-
ing increasingly sophisticated models of regulation. Although well intended, 
sometimes this approach neglects the fact that independent commission schemes 
lower the cost of «capture» by concentrating regulatory decisions.5
3 In the sense that there are less resources available to respond to litigation, given the financial constraints 
and the high shadow costs of public funds (resources are more socially profitable in health, education etc).
4 It is often argued that transaction costs are the main reason for contract incompleteness. First, is impossible 
for the parties to a transaction to know every relevant fact or anticipate every relevant contingency, and, second, 
even if one could foresee all contingencies, they may be so numerous that describing them in a contract would 
be too costly. Thus, the cost of writing contracts may lead to incompleteness.
5 Moreover, besides bribes and other commonly used means, more ways to capture are available under this 
scheme. For instance, the prospect of a well paid job for expert commissioners after the tenure, also known as the 
«revolving door», which is a common practice.
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II. THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF REGULATION
Most academic work regarding economic regulation of infrastructure is based 
on the idea of the so-called public interest. For instance, independent regulatory 
agencies usually have discretionary power to set fares and service standards accord-
ing to the public interest. The first problem with this approach is to define what 
the public interest is. One can argue that the public interest is something that can 
not be defined or discovered through rational analysis. As put by Gómez-Ibáñez 
(2003, p. 40), «There may be widespread agreement when goals are stated at a very 
general and abstract level, but the consensus often dissolves when the goals are 
translated into specific policies». Moreover, even if there is a public interest it may 
not be discovered through the rational deliberations of an expert regulatory agency. 
«Some critical information may not be available with reasonable time and effort, 
or so much information may be required that even a large and expert staff can not 
comprehend an analyze it all» (Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, p. 40).
The second problem that makes this approach vulnerable is the possibility 
of capture by special interests. There is ample evidence that independent agency 
members are rational actors and that their behavior is motivated by self interest.6 
As noted by Bernstein (1955), firms have much more subtle and legal methods to 
capture regulators than bribes. The prospect of secure, well paid jobs (or as consul-
tants) after they retire (revolving door), campaign contributions to legislators who 
oversee the regulatory agency, and even in some cases industry representatives, 
might capture the regulators intellectually simply because they spend so much 
time in each other’s company. In Latin America it is common to see regulators 
go from regulatory positions to jobs within the previously regulated industry, as 
well as other evidence of influence from special interests.7
Some may argue that the second problem should not be a matter of concern 
because it is precisely competition among special interest groups which encoura-
6 Typically, they are expected to respond in predictable ways to incentives in the form of salaries, work 
overload, budget, or other conditions. Moreover, even with carefully designed institutions that control for these 
variables –such as constitutional provisions– other, more subtle ways emerge.
7 In Colombia, for example, most coal or gas-propelled power plants are located in the Caribbean coast 
region, while hydroelectric plants are located in the Andean region. Often, members of the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (creg) favor regulatory decision according to their place of origin (ie., regulators from the Andean 
region favoring and promoting regulation beneficial to the hydroelectric industry and vice versa). This happens, 
presumably, due to the available room for patronage in the appointment process.
GABRIEL GARCÍA MORALES
36
ge policies that favor the broader public interest (Becker, 1983). However, reality 
seems to be more in accordance with Olson’s logic of collective action (Olson, 
1965). Olson relies on the rational choice concept of group behavior. He argues, 
contrary to the Becker’s assumption of private benefits, that the output of the 
interest groups is non-excludable (public). Thus, there is an incentive to free-ride. 
As a result, interest groups will fail to provide the optimal level of output. Fur-
thermore, Olson identifies the difficulties in creating new interest groups, which 
Becker does not recognize. It takes creative talent to form an interest group. 
Moreover, the transaction costs to organize an interest group can be very high, 
depending on the size of the group. Thus, a key condition for an interest group to 
succeed that it be small and homogeneous. Therefore, the problem of capture by 
special interests is not only relevant when explaining the ambiguity of the regula-
tion process but critical in renegotiation events.
Surprisingly, given the importance of political issues, public choice problems 
are not properly addressed when dealing with infrastructure concessions. Policy 
documents devote extensive space to technical issues, such as sources of project 
financing, level of investments, pricing, length of concession and awarding meth-
ods. They usually neglect political issues and treat them as secondary, though 
regulation is as much a political as a technical endeavor.8
III. DEFINING RENEGOTIATION
In order to characterize renegotiation it is important to classify the reasons for 
a profit maximizing firm to attempt to renegotiate (Bell, 2003). First, there are 
exogenous constrains. When a firm is operating in a new institutional environ-
ment it may underestimate the costs of running its business and may have paid 
too much for the right to operate. The second reason is the presence of exogenous 
events. The costs of insuring against many natural disasters, social unrest, and 
other outside events may deter firms from doing so. Instead, they tend to rely on 
renegotiations in case such events adversely affect their operations. The third rea-
8 One intuitive explanation may be that, among «technical experts», politics has a rather negative conno-
tation (as the work of politicians). Consequently, they tend to disregard political issues and take politics as a 
«given» or something than cannot be dealt with. 
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son is endogenous manipulation. When firms realize that contractual institutions 
are weak, they may try to take advantage by asking for renegotiation once they 
have a better understanding of the operating environment. Their argument here 
will be that the costs on which they base their proposals are unexpectedly higher 
due to any of the two reasons previously mentioned.9 This is what we will call op-
portunistic renegotiation.
Likewise, the government may be interested in renegotiation, arguing the first 
two cases in the opposite direction. For instance, cost being overestimated for the 
concession design for the first reason or macroeconomic shocks that benefit the 
firm10 for the second reason. Moreover, the government will also try to renegotiate 
when it is politically profitable11 or when it is captured by interest groups —a case 
that falls under the category of endogenous manipulation or opportunistic rene-
gotiation. Notice that, in the third case, analogously to the firm, the government 
will rely on arguments attributable to the first and second reason.
IV. THE EMPIRICS
Theories of renegotiation provide several hypotheses, some of them quite evi-
dent. The following were tested by Guasch (2004):12
1. Macroeconomic shocks increase the incidence of renegotiation.
2. More extensive investment obligations in a contract (that is, regulation by 
means as opposed to regulation by objectives) increase the incidence of re-
negotiation.
3. A more competitive award process (as opposed to bilateral negotiations) 
increases the incidence of renegotiation.
4. Minimum income guarantees decrease the incidence of renegotiation.
9 Exogenous events, such as natural disasters or macroeconomic shocks, are unambiguously observable. 
However, even in these cases there is scope for disagreement. As a result, some effects attributable to the firm 
itself will tend to be associated to the event.
10 For instance, when an unexpected improvement in the economic environment leads to substantially 
higher demand than the one estimated when the concession was awarded.
11 When users of the facilities constitute a high percentage of the voting population.
12 With a smaller sample Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) found similar results.
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5. Existence and structure of a regulatory agency reduce the incidence of rene-
gotiation.
6. As the number of concessions granted in a country increases, the incidence 
of renegotiation decreases.
7. Awarding concessions shortly before or shortly after elections increases the 
incidence of renegotiation.
8. Closer affiliation between winning bidders and the government increases 
the incidence of renegotiation.
9. Extensive corruption in a Country increases the incidence of renegotiation.
TABLE 2
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
by Country and Sector
      Award process Telecomuni-  Transpor- Water and
  Share
 cations Energy tation sanitation Total of Total      (percent)
Argentina 17 31 40 14 102 10.8%
Bolivia 0 17 5 2 24 2.5%
Brazil 87 7 50 50 194 20.6%
Chile 12 81 27 3 123 13.1%
Colombia 0 0 44 7 51 5.4%
Costa Rica 0 31 1 0 32 3.4%
Dominican Republic 1 10 3 0 14 1.5%
Ecuador 0 2 0 0 2 0.2%
Guatemala 1 0 2 0 3 0.3%
Honduras 1 8 0 1 10 1.1%
Jamaica 2 0 0 0 2 0.2%
Mexico 63 51 91 58 263 27.9%
Panama 0 0 5 0 5 0.5%
Peru 85 17 5 0 107 11.4%
Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 0 1 3 0.3%
Uruguay 0 0 2 1 3 0.3%
Republica Bolivariana 
    de Venezuela 3 0 1 0 4 0.4%
      
Total 273 256 276 137 942 100.0%
Source; Guasch (2004).
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As can be seen, hypotheses 1 to 4 are more related to technical13 issues, while 
hypotheses 5 to 9 are more related to institutional and political issues. Notice, 
however, that almost none of the studies provide any indication or even mention 
the potential effect of the characteristics of the legal system. Moreover, with few 
exceptions [certainly, Guasch (2004) and Laffont and Straub (2003)], none of the 
works treat in any detail the political issues. In the two cases cited, the authors 
developed hypotheses 5 to 9, although with one serious flaw in hypothesis 5 for 
empirical testing. Given the ambiguous role of regulation and the clear possibil-
ity of capture, there is no reason to expect that the relationship will go in that 
direction.14 Again, only brief mention is made of the potential effect of the legal 
system. Specifically, they mention that the existence of formal arbitration rules, 
making renegotiation less costly, increases the probability of renegotiation, but 
do not mention the characteristics of the legal systems and their potential effects.
V. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Not surprisingly, the existence of the regulatory body is the element with the 
greater (positive or increasing probability) incidence in the probability of renego-
tiation. Oddly, however, Guasch explains the result citing the fact that indepen-
dent regulators in Latin America are still the exception rather than the rule and 
that it is difficult to measure independence.
Another feature of the results that is worth mentioning is the effect of po-
litical issues on the probability of renegotiation. For instance, type of regulation 
—which, in spite of consistently being treated as a technical variable, is as much 
political— indicates that the some methods of regulation have a stronger effect in 
the positive direction (increasing probability) than others. Specifically, the effect 
of price cap regulation is greater than the effect of rate of return. Other results show 
that award criteria (i.e., minimum tariff or revenues) increase the probability of 
renegotiation.
13 For instance, source of project finance, level of investments, length of concessions, awarding methods and 
macroecomic shocks.
14 The ambiguous role of regulation necessarily leads us to think that it could go either way or even with more 




Finally, it is worth mentioning that macroeconomic shocks have a lower than 
expected effect on the incidence of renegotiation, compared to political, institu-
tional and other technical drivers of renegotiation. Moreover, political and insti-
tutional issues appear equally relevant as the technical drivers for the incidence 
of renegotiation, even without taking into account that most technical issues 
have political elements embedded. Therefore, these aspects should be analyzed 
to have a better understanding of the problem of renegotiation, rather than con-
tinuing to devise increasingly complex methods of regulation and awarding that 
do not take into account the political and institutional reality. Following this 
line, Section VI a model will be developed to show that the characteristics of legal 
systems do have an effect on the probability of renegotiation.
VI. LEGAL SYSTEMS AND RENEGOTIATION
The normative criterion to evaluate the outcomes of different legal systems in 
a rent seeking scenario is minimum aggregate legal expenditures. That is to say, 
TABLE 3
Marginal Effects of Significant Variables on the Probability of Renegotiation
 Significant variable affecting the Marginal effect on probability
 probability of renegotiation of renegotiation
 Existence of regulatory body 20-40 percent
 Award criteria 20-30 percent
 Type of regulation 20-30 percent
 Autonomy of regulatory body 10-30 percent
 Investment obligations 10-20 percent
 Nationality of concessionaire 10-20 percent
 Extent of the competition in awardprocess 10-20 percent
 Macroeconomic shocks 10-15 percent
 Electoral cycles 3-5 percent
 Award process 10-20 percent
Source: Guasch (2004).
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legal systems where aggregate litigation costs are low are superior to those that 
have high levels of aggregate litigation costs.
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2000) develop a simple auction-theoretic frame-
work to compare equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under different legal 
systems, modeling litigation (rent seeking) as an «all pay» auction. For that pur-
pose they characterize the legal payoff functions under the following assumptions:
1. Monotonic Legal Production Function. The quality of the case presented 
by each player is a continuous and strictly increasing function of their own 
legal expenditures.
2. Justice is always served. If party i presents the best case, party one wins with 
probability one. If the two parties’ cases are of identical quality, each party 
wins with probability ½.
3. Internalized Legal Costs. There are no subsidies or taxes; all legal expenses 
are borne by the litigants.
4. Regularity of Conditions on the Distribution of Valuations. The density of 
valuations is continuous and strictly positive on its support, [0, Lmax].















































 are legal expenditures and L
i 
is party i valuation.
Among the evaluated systems we have:
American System (α = β = 1): Each party pays its own legal expenses.
British System (“α = 1 and $β = 0):The loser pays his own legal expenses as 
well as those of the winning party.
15 Fee shifting parameters.
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Continental system: (“α = 1, 0 < β < 1): The loser pays his own costs and, in 
addition, a fraction ( 1- β) of the winner’s expenses.
Quayle System (“α = 2, β = 1): The loser pays his own costs and reimburses 
the winner up to the level of the loser’s won costs.
In proposition 8 they found that litigant’s expected equilibrium legal expen-
ditures are given by :
 
TC (β ) =
2
β




Thus, they conclude that legal systems with higher betas result in unambigu-
ously lower total expected costs, and the payoffs are strictly increasing in beta.
To summarize, they found that «the effective costs to society of a given legal 
system depend not only on the expected expenditures per trial16 under each sys-
tem, but the number of trials induced by each system. Ceteris paribus, systems that 
generate lower expected expenditures per trial provide greater expected payoffs 
from litigation, and therefore result in more cases being brought to trial». This is 
a very useful and interesting result. It is too general, however, for our purpose of 
showing the effects of legal systems on the probability of renegotiation within the 
context of infrastructure contracts.
VII. A MODEL OF LITIGATION IN CONCESSION 
CONTRACTS
Assuming conditions 1 to 4, following Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2000), 
an «opportunistic» firm presumably faces a trade off in its maximization program, 
between investing in effort to reduce costs and effort for litigation (renegotiate). 
The decision of investing in cost reducing efforts is preferred for society, while 
the decision to engage in litigation is clearly a rent seeking game, where the legal 
16 Notice, however, that under the « efficient rent seeking» concept (Tullock 1967) total legal expenditures 
are constrained by the value of the claim v.
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expenditures represent a cost for society «in terms of the foregone product of the 
resources employed».
A. The Model17
A government and a firm claim L through litigation. The government spends 
x and the firm spends y. Let “ P(x,y) be the probability the government wins and 
C
G
 (x) = c
G




 . y, the firm’s. The government 






 L - C (x) with prob. “P (x,y)
 -C (x) with prob. 1 - P“ (x,y)
while the firm is to maximize the expected value of U
F
(x,y) where




  L - C (y) with prob. 1 -“P (x, y)
In the case where,
 1 x > y
P “ (x,y) = ½ x = y 





(to indicate the high shadow costs of public funds, see footnote 3).
Under American Legal System. It is easy to show that the most the govern-
ment is willing to incur in litigation effort is x*
1. The effect of a «loser pays all» system
The expected rent from litigation is null. Thus, the agent will not litigate and 
thus his cost-reducing effort is optimal since this situation is identical to the one 
obtained in the case where the contract is fully enforceable.






Clearly, the agent faces a trade-off between investing in effort to be efficient or 
investing in effort to opportunistically renegotiate. Moreover, when the second 
alternative is chosen, we are taken to an inferior state. In this case, investing in 
efforts to opportunistically renegotiate might provide the agent relatively more 
profits while imposing rent-seeking costs to society. 
Therefore, systems, such as the British, that affect negatively the expected va-
lue of renegotiation (litigation), making it less attractive to the agent, will surely 
discourage opportunistic renegotiation.
To summarize, the type of legal system has a direct incidence on the proba-
bility of «opportunistic» behavior from the firm and, therefore, on the probabi-
lity of renegotiation. Thus, a greater rate of renegotiation is to be expected in 
infrastructure concessions in Latin American countries where legal systems are 
similar to that of the United States. Likewise, countries that have legal systems 
similar to the British, or «loser pays all» systems, are expected to have lower rates 
of renegotiation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have shown that political and institutional issues are as im-
portant as the technical issues in determining renegotiation. Thus, any reform 
intended to tackle the problem of opportunistic renegotiation should necessarily 
include them. Complex regulation methods that are the result of technical sophis-
tication that does not take into account political and institutional realities have 
largely failed. An example of this has been application of price cap regulation in 
Latin America. Furthermore, more regulation is not the answer. The imposition 
of requirements that are potentially intrusive runs the risk of ultimately incurring 
in social costs that outweigh potential welfare losses, even when the method was 
effective in preventing these welfare losses. Any advance in that direction will 
take us to an inferior state. Opportunistic renegotiation is a clear example of this.
Therefore, efforts to design policy should be oriented also towards the analy-
sis of the political and institutional environments where the problem emerges. 
For instance, we have shown that the characteristics of the legal system have some 
influence in the probability of renegotiation. Thus, any recipe that neglects this 
and other relevant issues of the same nature will surely fail to solve the problem.
For those countries with legal systems similar to the American, our findings 
suggest the advisability of introducing British-style reforms. However, attempts 
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to reform entire legal systems are time-consuming, costly and might have critical 
and unpredictable consecuences in other areas. Therefore, a viable short term 
alternative would be to include into concession contracts clauses that explicitly 
allocate the litigation costs in the desired way. 
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